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TABLE 2

611 ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS IN PRE-WAR EASTERN EUROPE (in lbs.)

	Wheat & Rye	Maize	Potatoes	Sugar	Meat	Milk	Fats	Eggs (No.)
Poland	382	—	550	27	50	260	21	90
Czechoslovakia	275	25	260	47	68	290	40	169
Hungary	550	—	220	28	57	240	30	95
Romania	245	400	110	15	55	140	25	90
Yugoslavia	265	340	130	12	44	160	18	45
Bulgaria	440	—	35	12	45	150	19	80
Denmark	265	Nil	250	117	124	410	67	115

* *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, pp. 44.

241 The land, some of it rich, but most of it poor, was exploited
311 in a backward fashion – in Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia many of the peasants worked with a wooden plow not very different in design from one described by Virgil in the *Georgics* 19 hundred years before. The inevitable subdivision of the land among the peasant's sons made application of modern agricultural techniques virtually impossible, and the accumulation of sufficient capital to purchase such equipment out of question. In addition, growing rural over-population kept farm wages low, and made the use of modern machinery uneconomical from the peasants' point of view.
[435] Above all, the peasantry was oppressed by the traditional "price scissors," or the disparity between the prices received for their crops on the urban market and prices paid for industrial products, a relationship which arose from the "small domestic market for agricultural products and the small supply of manufactured goods produced by domestic industry."[19]

But the trouble lay not merely in the backwardness of the peasant agricultural system. The political structure of the country, either conservative or semi-fascist, tended to favor urban groups. In the allotment of national resources such projects as peasant

[19] Moore, p. 89.

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241 211 banks, agro-technical training schools, agricultural machine industries, and rural communications received only minor allocations. The backward condition of rural transportation made the task of competing with foreign grain – especially American – on the world market that much more difficult and the lack of facilities for the fertilizer production helped maintain the low yield.

The institutional organization of agriculture placed strong impediments to improved efficiency and increased productivity. Thus the small size of peasant holdings, frequently scattered in tiny plots, subdivided through inheritance, in debt to local banks, sometimes still held under tenancy arrangements, all combined to blight the hopes raised by the first post-war reforms.

The means and resources of the various national governments were usually devoted to furthering industrial development and the accumulation of capital for favored projects from which the peasants rarely benefited. While in some countries import duties on motor cars might be reduced, duties on agricultural machinery were gradually raised.[13] The blind pursuit of such policies by the inter-war governments inevitably deepened the rift between town and country, and intensified peasant suspicion of the central regimes. In some cases the response of the regimes to such suspicions was to convert themselves into semi-fascist governments, which were not dependent upon that minimum of popular support which their semi-parliamentary predecessors required for continued existence.[14]

3. *World War II and After*

423 If World War I set in motion the process of land reform, World War II brought that process to a close. No doubt the sudden emergence of the Communists as a major political force in the area expedited completion of the reforms begun in the 1920s, but

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[13] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, p. 11-2. In Romania prior to 1928 the government imposed export duties on agricultural products. These duties were revoked but the general disregard for the needs of the landed population remained. And while it is true that there were efforts on the part of East European governments to make some administrative services available to the peasants (such as the Hungarian Social Fund, the O.N.Cs.A.) they were halting and generally short-lived.

[14] The process of excluding peasant parties from any kind of representation in the governments "began with Hungary in 1919, continued with Bulgaria in 1923, with Poland in 1926, with Yugoslavia in 1929, and with Rumania in 1931" (Mitrany, p. 122). Only the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was able to remain in power, and in Bulgaria the Agrarian Party returned briefly between 1930 and 1934.

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CHART IV

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS BY SIZE AND AREA IN EASTERN EUROPE – CIRCA 1930*



* Wilbert Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva), 1945, p. 82.

p. 35

severely limited by the special character of East European Communism. Bureaucratic in spirit and cautious by temperament, it was neither able, nor did it seriously attempt, to destroy the basic configuration of rural society. As late as 1953, the peasant population remained essentially stable, though the regimes had siphoned off surplus rural manpower to the rapidly expanding industrial centers. The land massing of the farms, on the Soviet model, radically altering the peasant social structure, lay far in the future. The problem facing the Communist planner was the much simpler one of altering the social structure sufficiently to destroy the peasants' capacity to sabotage industrial "grandeur" planned for the new cities.

The land structure prevailing in Eastern Europe after the reforms—the raw substance from which the Communists were to create collective farms — is described in Table 5. The following pattern emerges:

The number of "producing-consuming" units—agricultural holdings of five hectares and less, producing little surplus for the urban market — represented well over three-quarters of the total in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and perhaps two-thirds in Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In this category, approximately 30 percent of the total holdings in Poland and Bulgaria, 50 percent in Czechoslovakia and Romania, and as much as 65-70 percent in Yugoslavia and Hungary were dwarf farms, barely capable of covering the needs of the family in possession.

The group of medium peasant holdings—peasant farms of approximately 5-10 hectares—were a significant category chiefly in Poland and Hungary where they represented approximately one-quarter of the total. These farms were of lesser importance elsewhere in the region.

The group of medium-large holdings—farms of 10-20 hectares—comprised six percent or less of the total throughout the region, reaching 10 percent only in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The large peasant holdings, or "kulak" farms—of 15-20 hectares and more—varied throughout the region, ranging from one to four percent of the total.

As for the proportionate share of the total arable land, the structure of private ownership had the following characteristics (see Table 6):

TABLE 6

FARMLAND OWNERSHIP IN OR AROUND 1949*

Number of Private Farms (in thousands)

Holdings (in ha.)		Czechos.	Poland	Hung.†	Romania‡	Bulgaria	Yugos.§
Midget:	0-2	696	962	1,404	1,636	316	1,495
Small:	2-5	351	1,084	387	707	418	
Medium:	5-10	255	906	174	551	276	490
Med. Large:	10-20	159	347	55*	154	74	129
Large:	20-50	35	39	27*	34	–	92
TOTAL		1,496	3,338	2,047	3,082	1,084	2,206

† Hungary: divisions are 0-2.8; 2.8-5.7 ha.; 5.7-11.4 ha.; 11.4-20 ha.; 20-50 ha.

‡ Romania: divisions in the first two groups are: from 0-3 ha.; and from 3-5 ha.

§ Yugoslavia: divisions are: 0-5; 5-10; 10-15; and over 15 ha.

* Source as in Table 5.

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423 The "producing-consuming" units generally comprised
311 one-quarter to one-third of the farmland throughout the region, but in Hungary almost one-half the total.

The medium units, of five to 10 hectares, occupied between one-quarter and one-third of the farm area.

The medium-large holdings controlled 20 percent, or less, of the farmland in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and approximately 25 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the large holdings—upwards of 15-20 hectares—totaled 10-15 percent of the private farmlands, except in Bulgaria where they did not exist, and in Yugoslavia where they formed close to 20 percent.

661 Since the Communists' primary problem was the extraction of
423 agricultural produce from the countryside, the focus of the contemplated agrarian reorganization had to be those viable, surplus-producing farms which traditionally supplied the cities with the produce necessary to their existence. And because it was precisely these farms which were best able to withstand the slow economic pressures of the State, and least interested in economic reform, the Communists had to prepare for a formidable struggle. In order to impose collective structure on these farms, it was necessary to discriminate against them in favor of the collectives. But this very discrimination—the refusal to supply credits, mechanical equipment, and fertilizers, and the collection of higher taxes and delivery quotas—tended to destroy their vitality and decrease the surplus produce in which the Communists were interested. So long, therefore, as these farms remained outside the collective structure, their value to the Communists was decreased as collectivization progressed. Similarly, the favorable treatment afforded the collective farms tended to decrease their basic value to the State. It was difficult to extract a high surplus of produce from farms with lower delivery quotas. These internal contradictions would inevitably continue so long as the *process* of collectivization itself was not completed, and the use of discriminatory tactics was necessary.

It is not altogether surprising that the Satellite planners never pursued an entirely consistent policy in this regard. In the early years, they tended to concentrate on absorbing the poorer farms into the collectives because they were most vulnerable to Communist pressure and appeal. Later, they tended to concentrate on those larger farms whose collectivization was crucial to the success

of their land policy. But no matter how they proceeded—and the pattern differed from one country to another—they could not resolve the dilemmas posed by a slow paced collectivization. Had they been able to follow the Soviet model of full collectivization in several rapid and brutal campaigns, they might conceivably have avoided some of these pitfalls.

The chief surplus producing sector—the middle farms between 10 and 20 hectares—comprised some 900,000 units (See Table 6). The systematic dissociation of this stratum from the upper stratum of owners holding over 20 hectare holdings, and its methodical "fractionalization" represented one of the essential characteristics of the collectivization drive. It was *this* stratum of the farm population which the regime frequently labeled "kulak," adjusting its definition as it became necessary in each situation. By 1950 it was clear that this stratum represented a challenge to the Communists not—as it was alleged—because its members hired farm labor to help work their lands, but because it constituted the producing backbone of the nation, a source of productive strength which the Communists were determined to turn to their own ends.

4. *The Strategy Unfolded*

The post-war expulsions of the *Volksdeutsche* and other German minority groups from Eastern Europe and the expropriation of their lands, together with those of Nazi collaborators, gave the early Communist-dominated regimes their first hold over the agrarian economy. Particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the former German holdings formed the nucleus of the State Farms. Confiscation of the great latifundia in Hungary and of royal lands in Romania similarly created a reserve land fund on which the State could draw. In general, forest lands throughout the region were nationalized and administered by managerial panels created for that purpose. In addition, much pasture and meadowland was expropriated by a variety of legal devices, the over-all total equalling some two million hectares of first quality land. The State share in the combined forests, pasturage, and arable land of Eastern Europe ranged from 17 percent in Yugoslavia to 36 percent in Poland, and to as much as 41 percent in Czechoslovakia. Until 1949, the State farms still continued to play a minor role, except in Poland and Czechoslovakia where experiments along these lines were pushed very early.

During 1949-50 the State sector of agriculture expanded rapidly,

423 either by the simple process of extending existing land reserves, or
● 311 by acquisition—sometimes outright expropriation—of "kulak" lands or communally-organized "model" farms. By the close of 1949, State farms in Czechoslovakia, for example, had increased by 600 percent. By and large, however, the areas controlled by the State farms—particularly in Hungary—contained a disproportionate share of non-cultivated land (see Chart V).

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the State sector comprised an area of considerable importance, and it was on the State farms—theoretically, at least, the highest existing form of "Socialist agriculture"—that the chief Communist hopes rested. It is, in fact, the case that in the East European Satellites, State Farms achieved a higher level of development in general than in the Soviet Union at a comparable stage, since the initiative of the Russian peasantry in 1917-18 prevented the large-scale land seizures on which a State farming system could be based.

423 But in the Satellites, as in the Soviet Union, the primary effort
474 was devoted to the collective farm. In the Satellites, where the land offensive had a thoroughly bureaucratic character, the collective farms offered the additional advantage of *flexibility*. A variety of collectivized farms were created to facilitate the peasants' progress from independent farming to full collectivity. Even the terms used to describe the collective farms—"Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" in Poland, for example—were designed to blur the true implications and to mask the ultimate purpose of collectivization. Similarly, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the very name for collective farms—*zadrugi*—was a calculated attempt to evoke memories of the ancestral communal traditions of the southern Balkans.

Thus the regimes trod softly in the early years. In Czechoslovakia, for example, four types of "Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives" (UAC) were established from which the peasants—in accordance with the "voluntary" principle—might choose:

Type I — Joint tillage of the land, but retention of title in real property contributed, as well as in draft animals, farm equipment, and the harvested crops.

Type II — Joint tillage of the land, but title retained in real property, draft animals, and farm equipment; all boundaries plowed over, and plots grouped in "land

CHART V

GROWTH of STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

(percent of arable Land)

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

* Rude Pravo, October 28, 1952; Rocznik Statis. 1949 (Warsaw), 1950; For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (Bucharest), January 30, 1953; March 17, 1950; September 11, 1953; Agerpress IVth Year (Bucharest), No. 2, January 17, 1953; Pari i Kredit (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 80.

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TABLE 8

PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND COLLECTIVIZED*
1945 - 1953

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	June 1953	Dec. 1953
Bulgaria	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.0	11.3	43.0	47.5	51.0	51.7	51.7
Romania					0.1	2.7	3.1	7.2	7.5	7.5
Hungary					0.5	2.6	3.1	18.2	24.6	20.0
Czechoslovakia**					5.4	16.5	19.0	37.9	40.0	38.0†
Poland					0.3	2.2	3.5	4.8	6.7	6.7
Yugoslavia**		0.9	1.5	2.3	13.3	16.1	13.8	11.4	9.5†	—

* Sources for these figures are given in Tables 11 to 20.

** Agricultural land, not arable land.

† The exact dimensions of the kolkhoz dissolutions which have taken place in 1953 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have not been made public; the figures given above are based on scattered evidence and official hints *Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* [Prague], 19 December 1953, and G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslawiens*, [Berlin, 1952].)

CHART VI

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(Percent of arable land collectivized)

1945-1953

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

* Data in tables 9 through 17.

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TABLE 9

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA*

1944 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farms	Percent Arable Land
1944	110								
1945	382	272	34,362	90	383	4.2	146,570	3.1	3.0
1946	480	98	41,027	85	359	4.2	172,498	3.7	3.5
1947	549	69	44,100	80	327	4.1	180,040	4.0	3.7
1948	1,100	551	78,900	72	265	3.7	292,380	6.7	6.0
1949	1,608	508	156,483	97	343	3.5	551,572	14.3	11.3
1950	2,587	979	525,628	203	809	4.0	2,092,215	48.0	43.0
1951	2,739	152						51.0	47.5
1952	2,739	0						52.0	51.0
1953	2,747	8	568,989	207	915	4.4	2,512,500	52.3	51.7**

* *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 3, 1952, December 2, 1953.

** The figure given by the regime since 1952 for the percentage of arable land is 60.5, and this figure has gained general acceptance among Communist theoreticians and many Western observers. However, it is clear that the figure 60.5 measures a different arable land area than was used in computing the earlier percentagewise figures. The percentages given for 1949 and 1950 indicate that the arable land at the time was approximately 4.9 million hectares; but the 1952 percentage indicates arable land of only 4.15 million hectares. Since the regime has frequently claimed a steadily expanding area of cultivation, this statistical juggling does not make any sense. Therefore, this chart bases its 1952 and 1953 percentagewise calculations upon the same arable land figure used by the regime prior to 1952.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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* Statistički Bilten Poljoprivredo Ekonomski, No. 6, 1951, p. 5.



* Rude Pravo (Prague), March 5, 1953

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CHART IX

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA BY DISTRICT*

* Statistics from Report on Bulgaria, Institute National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950.

CHART X

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND BY PROVINCE*

1953

(Percentage of Villages with Collective Farms)



* Ekonomista (Warsaw) 3rd quarter, 1953.

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TABLE 10

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective§	Average Size Collective§	Hectares per Household§	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	56	56	4,058	72	—	—	12,500†	0.1
1950	1,027	971	67,719	66	261†	4.0	268,000	2.7
1951	1,069	42	75,065	70	277†	—	300,000†	3.1
1952	1,796	727	165,411	92	360†	—	700,000†	7.2
1953 (June)	1,980	184	185,000	90	369	4.1	732,000	7.5

* Speech of Minister of the Army Botnaras, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953; *Scanteia*, April 12, 1953; Speech of Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953; *Scanteia*, March 1, 1953; *Probleme Economice*, (Bucharest), No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1953.

† These are estimates, calculated on the basis of known ratios between number of collectives, number of hectares collectivized, and number of households.

§ Calculated on the basis of official data.

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has presented its rulers with singular economic and organizational problems. 423 474

The two crucial years of Romanian collectivization were 1950 and 1952; these two offensive years alternated with periods of quiescence. In 1952, more than 50 percent of the total area collectivized to date was brought into the "Socialist sector," and in the same year the size of individual collective farms themselves increased rapidly. Though the number of new collectives increased by only 75 percent, the area brought into collectives increased by over 130 percent.

In accordance with the general East European patterns, the Romanian collectives were composed of a high percentage of medium farms, a percentage which increased each year (see Table 11). In 1953, the middle farmers comprised 57.8 percent of the total, the small farmers 35.2 percent, and landless farmers the remaining 7.0 percent. While the average size of all Romanian farms is 3.6 hectares, the average size of farms brought into collectives is 4.0 hectares.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN ROMANIAN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1953

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	1949-50	1951	1952	1953
Medium farmers	32.0	29.4	53.0	57.8
Small farmers	62.4	39.0	37.4	35.2
Landless farmers	5.6	31.6	9.6	7.0

* *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest) No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 10, 1953.

A unique feature of Romanian collectivization is the establishment of a very "primitive" type of collective, the "Agricultural Associations." Whereas the other countries issue agricultural decrees with a single standard for the entire collective sector, the Romanian agricultural decrees usually distinguish between "Agricultural Associations" and collectives. Including the "Agricultural

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TABLE 12

COLLECTIVIZATION IN HUNGARY*

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size of Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	1,520	980	37,000	24	137	5.7	208,000	3.7
1950	2,500	1,233	90,000	36	176	4.1	440,000	8.2
1951	4,652	2,152	236,500	51	187	3.7	865,000	16.0
1952	5,315	663	318,500	59	258	4.8	1,374,000	24.6
1953 (April)	—	—	340,000	–	–	4.4	1,494,000	26.8
1953 (Dec.)	4,677	–638	238,000††	51	250	4.7	1,117,000**	20.0

* *Statistikai Szemle* (Budapest) – various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep*, January 25, 1950, January 21, 1951, October 27, 1950, February 26, 1951, December 2, 1951; December 16, 1952, May 11, 1953; Radio Budapest, December 29, 1953.

** Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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TABLE 18

1949 - 1953

COLLECTIVIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

(Types II, III, and IV)

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	1,700¢	1,700	–	–	–	–	375,000	5.4
1950	3,766	2,060¢	–	–	302	–	1,134,392	16.5
1951	4,452	682	–	–	293	–	1,305,610	19.0
1952	7,290	2,838	–	–	356	–	2,598,073	37.9
1953**	8,284	994	343,911	41	–	8.4	2,900,000¢	40.0

* J. Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 15, 1953; *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), February 1, 1953, pp. 15-16; *Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1952.

** This figure represents the high point in Czechoslovak collectivization; by the end of 1953 the number of collectivised households had fallen off slightly (see speech of Agricultural Minister Uher, printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953).

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAK COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
—1953—

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Farm Unit (in Hectares)	Percent of Total Farms Collectivized
0-0.5	10.8
0.5-2	22.4
2-5	26.9
5-10	23.5
10-15	13.0
Over 15	3.4
	100.0

* *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 1, 1953.

POLAND

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For a variety of reasons, the impact of collectivization in Poland has been slight. The State farms, organized immediately after the Second World War, controlled nearly twice as much arable land as all collectives formed by mid-1953. In central Poland—that is to say, in the regions of Poland's pre-war territories still remaining (excluding the formerly German districts in the West)—collectivization has hardly been invoked. The majority of Polish collective farms are situated in the old German regions of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia—where the transfer of populations, confiscation of German properties, and firm Party political control made collectivization far easier.

Whether the vigorous land drive launched in early 1953 (and since slowed down in accordance with Satellite-wide political and economic policies) would have resulted in the rapid expansion of the collective sector is now impossible to say. In Poland, the average size of farms collectivized far exceeded the early post-war national average—approximately 7.5 hectares per holding as against 5.9. Thus, the weight of the Polish farm offensive was directed

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TABLE 15

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND*
1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farmers	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	243	243	—	—	226	—	54,830	—	0.3
1950	2,199	1,946	49,500	23	213	9.4	467,611	1.4	2.2
1951	3,054	855	71,000	23	239	10.1	728,561	2.1	3.5
1952	4,900	1,846	100,000	20	204	10.0	1,000,000	3.1	4.8
1953§	7,982	3,082	189,000	24	175	7.4	1,400,000	5.9**	6.7

* Instytut Ekonimiki Rolnej, *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952); *Economista* (Warsaw), III, 1953; *Zycie Gospodarzce* (Warsaw), September 6, 1953.

§ Official collectivization statistics for 1953 are extremely confused and contradictory. The figures presented here are for June, 1953; in subsequent months different figures were released, but they were so inconsistent that the June estimates are employed here. During the summer of 1953 collectivization came to a halt in Poland, and hence the situation remained approximately static throughout the rest of the year.

** Estimate.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

8; Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

CHART XI

COMPOSITION of COLLECTIVIZED and NON-COLLECTIVIZED SECTORS in POLAND 1953*

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423
474



* Nowe Drogi, (Warsaw) No. 10, 1953, p. 183.

p. 75

423 474 against the efficient, surplus-producing farm units. A comparison of the collectivized and free sectors in 1953 is set out in Table 16. While only 40 percent of the independent farms were larger than five hectares, slightly more than 75 percent of those collectivized were drawn from this category.

● 311 474

TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN POLISH COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1951 —

Farm Unit	Percent of Farms Collectivized
Landless	5.8
0 - 2	6.1
2 - 5	14.2
5 - 10	62.8
10 - 15	10.2
Over 15	0.9

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 131.

423 474 In Poland the collective sector controls 6.7 percent of the total arable land, as against almost 12 percent organized into State Farms. Four types of collectives exist in Poland; the most developed type approaches the Soviet artel.

● 311
483
474

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

TABLE 17

COLLECTIVIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA*
1946 - 1952

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective**	Average Size Collective**	Hectares per Household**	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1946	494	494	25,062	51	246	4.8	121,518	0.9
1947	779	285	40,590	52	270	5.2	210,986	1.5
1948	1,318	539	60,158	46	246	5.4	323,98[illegible]	2.3
1949	6,625	5,307	340,739	52	278	5.4	1,839,978	13.3
1950	6,968	343	418,659	60	318	5.3	2,226,166	16.1
1951	6,994	26	429,784	62	371	6.0	2,595,000	18.8
1952	6,908	–86	—	—	267	—	1,580,000	11.4

Informationi Priruenik, (Belgrade), Vol. I, p. 767; *Review of International Affairs*, (Belgrade), Sept. 16, 1952, pp. 16-18; October 1, 1952, pp. 17-18; G. F. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens* (Berlin, 1952).

**Calculated on the basis of official figures.

existed for a considerable period before the new measures were introduced.[3]

To assess the results of collectivization in Eastern Europe it is necessary to apply the same measuring rod applied to the Soviet Union: to what degree did collectivization facilitate the task of increasing the State's share of the total agricultural product without a proportionate increase in agricultural investment?

This was, in fact, the exact criterion to which Boris Kidric, the Yugoslav economic planner, was referring when he declared in 1947 that the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[4] If, despite every other failure, collectivization has expedited this "supply," it has justified itself in Communist eyes.

As in the USSR, land reorganization in Eastern Europe has not resulted in an appreciable increase in East European farm productivity; in many instances, the reverse has been true. That the pre-war levels of agriculture have not yet been regained in Hungary is now freely admitted by Hungarian Communist spokesmen.[5] The Polish theoretician, Stefan Jedrychowski, in a revealing analysis of post-Stalin policies, acknowledged that "in Romania, as well as in Czechoslovakia, agricultural production as a whole has not yet reached the pre-war level, although, for example, it has in the case of cattle."[6] Polish Premier Bierut confessed that the situation in Poland was not very healthy compared to pre-war standards.[7]

Indeed, the conclusions of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), issued in 1952 long before the New Course policies, and based upon many unofficial sources, seems generous in retrospect: "All countries in the region," the FAO report stated, "with the exception of Poland, were at, or only slightly below, the pre-war level of agricultural production, and for the

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[3] It has been suggested by many that the New Course of 1953 was the consequence of a mounting, ever-deepening economic crisis. However, it is difficult to support such a thesis because, with the possible exception of Hungary, the economic problems which the Communists are now attacking with such vigor have existed for a long time. A more plausible hypothesis is that the political crisis caused by Stalin's death made intolerable the continuation of the vast economic disproportions which had hitherto been mastered.

[4] See above p. 46.

[5] Jozsef Reval, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), October-November, 1953. The crowning indictment of Hungarian agriculture was Reval's declaration that its livestock situation was "worse than it is in the USSR."

[6] Stefan Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[7] Report of Premier Bierut to the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.